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SHOULD SPECIAL EDUCATION HAVE A PRICE TAG? A
NEW REASONABLENESS STANDARD FOR COST
INTRODUCTION
The increasing cost of educating disabled children is one of the
most pressing concerns among educators today.1 According to the most
recent national study, the total spending on special education students
was $50.0 billion compared to only $27.3 billion for regular education
during academic year 1999-2000.2 Another study reported the national
average of per pupil expenditures for special education as $12,525,
which was ninety-one percent more than the general education popula-
tion per pupil expenditure of $6,556. 3 Between 1995 and 2003, the num-
ber of students classified as needing special education services jumped
from roughly 4.5 million nationwide to approximately 6.3 million, a
4thirty-eight percent increase.
A circuit split exists surrounding the best test to employ when de-
termining the most appropriate classroom placement of a special educa-
tion student under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA).5 One of
the most controversial issues surrounding the circuit split concerns if and
how the cost of a particular placement to a school district should factor
into the decision of which learning environment is most appropriate for
the child.6 This article first provides a brief legislative history of IDEA
which has strongly influenced the emergence of the three different circuit
tests. Second, this piece describes the evolution of the three tests includ-
ing their strengths and weaknesses as well as the Tenth Circuit's recent
adoption of one of the tests in L.B. ex rel. KB. v. Nebo School District.
7
Third, it discusses the court's failure in Nebo to articulate practical stan-
dards and argues that the Tenth Circuit erred in failing to include cost as
one of its factors. Finally, this article proposes a new cost standard for
1. Telephone Interview with Pam Biscelgia, Legal Assistant, Denver Pub. Sch., in Denver,
Colo. (Dec. 16, 2005).
2. Thomas Parrish, American Inst. for Research, Accountability in Special Education Fi-
nance 4 (Apr. 11, 2003), http://www.eprri.org/Presentations/Session5.ppt; e-mail from Thomas B.
Parrish, Dir., Ctr. for Special Educ. Fin., American Inst. for Research (Dec. 19, 2005, 07:13:00
MDT) (on file with author). Prior to this study, another national study had not been conducted for
fifteen years. Id.
3. Jay G. Chambers, et. al., Total Expenditures for Students with Disabilities, 1999-2000:
Spending Variation by Disability, Report 5, Special Educ. Expenditure Project 6 (June 2003),
http://www.csef-air.org/publications/seep/national/Final SEEP Report 5.pdf
4. Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat (data taken from statistical table
using "Build a Table" tool provided at web site) (on file with author).
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2005).
6. See Theresa M. Willard, Economics and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
The Influence of Funding Fonnulas on the Identification and Placement of Disabled Students, 31
IND. L. REV. 1167, 1178 (1998).
7. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
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the courts to consider in placing a disabled child in the most suitable
learning environment.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IDEA
In 1975, the United States Congress enacted the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act.8 Replacing the Education for all Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 9 Congress passed IDEA to address its increasing
concerns that disabled children did not share the same educational rights
as their nondisabled classmates.'0 Congress aimed to remedy this ineq-
uity by allocating federal funding to states that complied with the Act's
principal goal of ensuring that all disabled students receive a "free and
appropriate public education (FAPE)... in the least restrictive environ-
ment (LRE)."" In defining LRE, Congress expressed a strong prefer-
ence that disabled students obtain instruction in a "regular" education
classroom wherever possible: "to the maximum extent possible, children
with disabilities ... [must be] educated with children who are not dis-
abled .... 12 The LRE requirement would in rare circumstances permit
placements in segregated or pull-out classrooms for students with more
severe disabilities.'
3
The 1997 Amendments to IDEA had two goals: (1) "to strengthen
the [LRE] requirement," and (2) to develop and improve the role and
rights of the family in determining what that LRE should be. 14  The
IDEA mandate established procedural safeguards to both protect the
rights of the disabled and establish realistic expectations for the
schools.1 5 To better accomplish the task of identifying the most suitable
LRE for a child, the school district must write and revise what is called
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2005).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat 773 (1975).
10. Willard, supra note 6, at 1167.
11. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive
Environment Provision of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400
et seq., 189 A.L.R. FED. 297 (2004); accord Anne E. Johnson, Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring
the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process Hearings to Balance Children's Rights
and Schools'Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591, 591 (2005).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). This section of IDEA describes the statute's goal to "include"
or "mainstream" disabled children into the regular classroom:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with chil-
dren who are not disabled, and special classes, separate school, or other removal of chil-
dren with disabilities from the regular education environment occurs only when the na-
ture or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in the regular with the
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id.
13. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that placement of a
disabled child in a segregated special education class in a public school may satisfy the LRE provi-
sion, depending on the child's needs).
14. Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of
Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REv. 809, 816-17 (2002) (quoting 20
U.S.C. 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii) (1997) and citing S. REP. No. 105-17, at 4 (1997), H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at
3 (1997)).
15. Johnson, supra note 11, at 594.
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an "individualized education program" (IEP) for every special education
student. 16 Then, a team of parents, special educators, regular classroom
teachers, an administrator, and other service providers meet to consider
the child's present abilities and needs before designing tailored annual
learning goals and deciding the most appropriate LRE setting.
17
What IDEA failed to do, however, was to adequately fund its initia-
tive. Although Congress is authorized under the IDEA to pay for forty
percent of special education funding to the states, 19 in the state of Colo-
rado, for example, in 2004, the federal government contributed only sev-
enteen percent.20 This funding shortfall coupled with rapidly increasing
numbers of disabled students being classified has sparked an ongoing
debate.2' A central issue of that debate involves conflicting interpreta-
tions of whether cost ought to play a role in a child's LRE placement.22
Today, IDEA compliance issues such as this have divided the cir-
cuits. 23  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not visited the topic of
IDEA mandates in over twenty years and has never decided the issue of
LRE and placement.24 In Board of Education v. Rowley,25 the Court de-
veloped a two-part test to evaluate whether a school district had met the
IDEA standard for providing a "free appropriate public education" (not
LRE) when it failed to provide a sign-language interpreter for a hearing
impaired child.26 In the first part of the test, the Court focused on
whether the district was in compliance with the procedural requirements
of IDEA.27  Since the Court determined that the district had complied
with the procedural requirement, it then had to evaluate the second
28prong.
In part two of the test, the Court assessed whether the school had
designed an IEP that afforded the student the opportunity to receive an
16. Farley, supra note 14, at 814.
17. Id. at 814-15.
18. See Willard, supra note 6, at 1179.
19. Id.
20. Telephone Interview with Charman Paulmeno, Supervisor, Grants Fiscal Mgmt. Services
Unit, Colo. Dep't of Educ., in Denver, Colo. (Dec. 19, 2005).
21. See Willard, supra note 6, at 1177.
22. Kevin D. Stanley, A Model for Interpretation of Mainstreaming Compliance Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Educ. Act: Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 65 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 303,
310-11 (1996).
23. Farley, supra note 14, at 818-19.
24. Stanley, supra note 22, at 306-07.
25. 458 U.S. 176.
26. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181, 206-07.
27. Id. at 207 n.27. To satisfy this requirement, the school district must prove that "the State
has adopted the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act ... [and] . . . created an
[individualized education program] for the child in question which conforms with the requirements
of§ 1401(19)." Id.
28. See id. at 206-07.
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appropriate education. 29 The Court determined that the hearing-impaired
child was performing above average and that the district was providing
her with personalized instruction and extra services for her needs. 30 In
concluding that the district had provided the child an appropriate educa-
tion, the Court also indicated that a sign language interpreter was not
necessary since the child was progressing well without one.3' Although
the Rowley test is not directly applicable to the issue of LRE placement,32
it did lay a foundation for the three tests that would soon emerge among
the circuits to determine a special education student's LRE.33
II. A THREE-WAY SPLIT
A. Background: LRE Provisions §§ 1212(a) & 1214
IDEA's failure to articulate a clear standard for what a school dis-
trict must do to provide an "appropriate" education for a disabled child
prompted the Supreme Court to respond in kind in the Rowley decision.
34
Conversely, IDEA's failure to offer clear standards to aid districts in
deciding what sort of placement constitutes a disabled child's LRE has
left the circuits to their own devices for three decades since the Act was
passed. " The circuits have therefore developed three distinct tests to
interpret and apply the IDEA in cases that challenge a school district's
LRE placement of a disabled child. 36 In various applications, all three
tests consider the benefits that the child receives in the regular classroom
and the potential disruption the child's presence may cause to the learn-
ing of other students in the classroom. 37 The language in two of the tests
explicitly considers cost in evaluating placement, while the language in
the other test does not.38
While the tests share several commonalities, a split exists where the
circuits have been unable to come to a consensus on which factors to use
and when to apply them.39 The circuit split translates into inconsistent
interpretation of IDEA's LRE, resulting in inconsistent placements
across the country.40 In other words, "[t]his difference could result in
29. Id. Some factors the court considered to evaluate part two of the test included how well
the handicapped student's education parallels the expectations at the corresponding regular grade
level and to see if the student is able to earn passing grades. Id. at 207 n.28.
30. Id. at 184-85.
31. Id.
32. See A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987).
33. See Joseph A. Patella, Missing the "IDEA ": New York's Segregated Special Education
System, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 239, 240-42 (1995).
34. See Stanley, supra note 22, at 305, 07.
35. See Willard, supra note 6.
36. Stanley, supra note 22, at 310.
37. See generally Farley, supra note 14, at 837-39 (comparing the educational benefits and
disruptive impact associated with supplementary aids and services in regular education with those of
a more segregated setting).
38. See Stanley, supra note 22, at 308-10.
39. See Farley, supra note 14, at 818-19.
40. Id. at 809-10.
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completely different placements being found 'appropriate' for the same
student. 'Al For example, a special education student from a military fam-
ily might find himself in a self-contained classroom segregated from
regular education students in one part of the country one year, and in a
mainstream education classroom with a classroom assistant and supple-
mental therapy in another state the next year.42 Similarly, where cost is a
factor at issue, the resulting disparaging placements are magnified.43
While Massachusetts has placed over sixty percent of the state's mentally
retarded population into regular mainstream classrooms, Kentucky, Ten-
nessee, Michigan, and Ohio have only mainstreamed ten percent of their
mentally retarded children.44 The inconsistent interpretations between the
three tests thus undermine the IDEA's goal of granting equal protection
to special education students across the country.45
B. The Roncker Test
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit developed the first test in Roncker v. Wal-
ter.46 The issue in Roncker surrounded whether the district's placement
of a nine year old boy with severe mental retardation and seizures was
his LRE.4 7 The district court upheld the school district's "LRE" place-
ment in a self-contained classroom with exclusively mentally retarded
students, even though the placement did not allow the child to interact
with non-disabled peers.48 On appeal, the court held that "[in] a case
where a segregated facility is considered superior, the court should de-
termine whether the services which make the placement superior could
be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the place-
ment in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act.'49
Heeding Congress's "strong preference" for mainstreaming, the court
reasoned that IDEA mandates that disabled students receive regular
classroom instruction unless the benefits of the segregated classroom
would far outweigh those in the mainstreamed setting.50
In determining whether a school district's placement of a student is
the LRE, the court articulated three factors: (1) the benefits to the dis-
abled child of receiving regular education classroom instruction as com-
pared to those received from the special education instruction in a segre-
gated classroom; (2) the potentially disruptive impact of the disabled
child on the teacher and students in the regular classroom; and (3) the
41. Stanley, supra note 22, at 311.
42. See Farley, supra note 14, at 818-19.
43. See Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
44. Id. at 311.
45. See id.
46. 700 F.2d 1058; Willard, supra note 6, at 1172.
47. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.
48. Id. at 1061.
49. Id. at 1063.
50. Id.
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cost of mainstreaming. 51 To evaluate the cost factor, the court consid-
ered whether the expense of such extensive supplemental aid required for
the child to be mainstreamed was so significant that it would mean taking
away funding that other district students also needed.52 The court indi-
cated that it retained some discretion in deciding "whether one program
is excessively expensive in comparison to another." 53 However, in its
holding, the court did not directly discuss the issue of cost and failed to
articulate a clear standard for assessing whether one program is too ex-
pensive or not.54
Following the Sixth Circuit's lead, the Eighth Circuit adopted the
Roncker test in A. W v. Northwest,55 stressing the cost factor in its hold-
ing that placing the student in a mainstreamed classroom was not feasible
due to the expense.56 Because the child's handicap was so severe, the
court concluded that the child was not benefiting from mere observation
of other students in the mainstream classroom.57 More importantly, pro-
viding the child's education in a regular setting would require the costly
hiring of a specially trained teacher for this one student in the school.58
Citing Roncker's suggestion that cost is "a proper factor to consider since
excessive spending on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped
children," 59 the court upheld the district's placement because the minimal
benefit of the child's placement in the mainstream setting was out-
weighed by the "reduction in unquestioned benefits to other handicapped
children which would result from an inequitable expenditure of the finite
funds available. 6°
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit approved the Roncker test in
Devries v. Fairfax County School Board61 in 1989. There, the court up-
held a vocational placement over the seventeen-year-old autistic boy's
local high school even though it was a segregated placement and thirteen
miles away.62 The court applied Roncker's reasoning: "In a case where
the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine
whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasi-
bly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in




53. Id. at 1066.
54. See id. at 1059-64.
55. 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987).
56. See A.W., 813 F.2d at 163.
57. A. W.. 813 F.2d at 161-62.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 163.
60. Id. at 162-63.
61. 882 F.2d 876, 878-80 (4th Cir. 1989).
62. Devries, 882 F.2d at 880.
63. Id. at 879 (quoting Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063).
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C. The Daniel R.R. Test
Six years after the Roncker decision, the Fifth Circuit developed an
alternative test for LRE in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education.
64
Here, the court pointed to the statutory language of IDEA's LRE defini-
tion as the basis for its two-part evaluation of special education services:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes,
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the na-
ture or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services can-
not be achieved satisfactorily.
65
The first part of the inquiry investigates whether the child could re-
ceive an FAPE in the regular classroom setting.66 If a regular classroom
is not possible and the school intends to place the child in a more restric-
tive classroom, the second part seeks to ensure that the child is still
placed in the LRE.6 7
Under the first prong of the test, the court assesses four factors: (1)
whether education in the regular classroom can be achieved successfully
with the incorporation of "supplementary aids and services;" (2) the
benefits to the child in achieving goals on her IEP in the regular class-
room; (3) the overall experience and benefits to the child in the main-
stream setting as compared to the segregated classroom situation; and (4)
the impact that the child's disability would have on the regular classroom
including the other students' abilities to learn and the teacher's ability to
effectively teach without disruption.68
The court in Daniel R.R. upheld the school district's decision to re-
move Daniel, a six-year-old boy with Down's Syndrome to a self-
contained classroom, because application of the factors in the first prong
of the test indicated that this would be to his benefit and the benefit of
other students.69  The court concluded that the regular kindergarten
teacher made "genuine and creative efforts to reach Daniel, devoting a
substantial - indeed, a disproportionate - amount of her time and di-
vert[ing] much of her attention away from the rest of the students. 70
Finding that the child's handicap had impeded his development, the court
64. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2005); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. "The term 'supplementary aids
and services' means aids, services, and other supports that are provided in regular education classes
or other education-related settings to enable children with disabilities to be educated with nondis-
abled children to the maximum extent appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2005).
66. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
67. Id. at 1050.
68. Id. at 1048-49.
69. Id. at 1050.
70. Id.
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concluded that he was unable to benefit academically. 71 Furthermore, the
court determined that the benefits of the special education classroom
outweighed the only benefit of the regular classroom-which was inter-
action with nondisabled peers.72 Finally, the court felt that the child's
presence in the classroom was disruptive to the other children, especially
given the disproportionate amount of time the teacher had to spend on
him.
73
Having determined that the child could not successfully receive in-
struction in a mainstreamed classroom under the first prong of the test,
the court then moved to the second prong to ensure that the child would
still be properly placed in his LRE.74 The court considered whether the
school district, in placing the child in a self-contained setting, had com-
plied with IDEA by taking immediate steps to include the child in main-
streamed activities such as gym, art, or lunch to the maximum extent
possible.75 Under the second prong of the test, the court found that the
school district had indeed taken appropriate and timely steps to main-
stream the student by including him with regular education students for
recess and lunch.76
In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. chose not to include cost
as an explicit factor in its test." However, the court may have left open
the possibility that cost might be relevant on occasion in its suggestion
that the Daniel R.R. factors were not "an exhaustive list. '78 In its only
mention of cost, the court cited Roncker, but quickly dismissed it as a
non-issue in Daniel R.R., since neither party broached the issue.79
The Third Circuit was next to apply the Daniel R.R. test in Oberti v.
Board of Education,8 0 noting that the language in the two-pronged test
more closely connected to the wording in IDEA.8' Specifically, the court
approved how the test stressed the importance of mainstreaming "to the
maximum extent appropriate" and required IEPs to address "each child's
specific needs."8 2 In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit also adopted the Daniel
R.R. test in Greer v. Rome City School District.8 3 Subsequently, as the
courts reviewed more and more cases, they began articulating and de-
lineating more specific standards for each of the factors in the test.84 For
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1050-51.
73. Id. at 1051.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1051.
77. Id. at 1049 n.9.
78. Id. at 1048.
79. Id. at 1049 n.9.
80. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
81. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215.
82. Id.
83. 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11 th Cir. 1991).
84. See generally Farley, supra note 14, at 825-28.
[Vol. 83:3
2006] L.B. EX REL. K.B. V. NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT 771
example, where the school district had not made a good faith effort to
actually provide supplemental services or include the student in a main-
stream class at all, the district court in Girty v. School District of Valley
Grove8 5 held that the school district failed factor one of prong one.86 The
court found that the school district had not made "reasonable" efforts to
accommodate the child in a regular education classroom.87
To date, the Second Circuit has not formally adopted one test over
the others, although in Briggs v. Board of Education,88 the court over-
turned a district court decision relying on Roncker.89 However, in Mavis
v. Sobol,90 the Second Circuit was one of the first courts to identify that a
correlation between the student's level of disruption (factor three) and
the level of supplemental aids potentially exists (factor one) in Daniel
R.R. 91 Because the school district had not shown that the student in the
case had been adequately provided with aids known to reduce disruptive
tendencies, the court held that the school district failed the third factor of
the Daniel R.R. test, and therefore, could not "rely on Emily's asserted





D. The Rachel H. Test
In Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H. , the Ninth
Circuit combined features of the Roncker and the Daniel R.R. tests to
produce the last major test, commonly referred to today as the Rachel H.
test.94 At issue in Rachel H. was the appropriate placement of a moder-
ately retarded eleven-year-old. 95 The district's proposal split her time
between regular and special education classes, while the parents advo-
cated for a full-time regular education placement. 96 Holding for the par-
ents, the district court did not adopt one of the two earlier tests outright-
and did so without any explanation.97 Instead, it identified the four key
factors as being: (1) the "educational benefits" in a regular classroom
with additional "aids and services" compared to the benefits in the spe-
cial education classroom; (2) "the nonacademic benefits" of working
with non-disabled students; (3) whether the student's presence creates a
negative or disruptive impact on the instruction and learning process of
85. 163 F. Supp. 2d 527 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
86. Girty, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 534-36.
87. Id. at 534-35.
88. 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. Farley, supra note 14, at 827 n. 198.
90. 839 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
91. Farley, supra note 14, at 828.
92. Mavis, 839 F. Supp. at 991.
93. 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
94. Stanley, supra note 22, at 312.
95. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400.
96. Id.
97. Farley, supra note 14, at 829.
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the regular education students; and (4) the cost required to provide the
supplemental aids and services to include the child.98
The school district argued that the four factors indicated that inclu-
sion was the LRE for the moderately retarded girl.99 The court con-
cluded that (1) with the aid of supplemental services, Rachel could re-
ceive a satisfactory education in the regular classroom;' 00 (2) the child's
self esteem would improve in the mainstream setting; (3) she was not
disruptive to the learning environment; 10 and finally, (4) the court found
that the district had not met its burden to prove excessive cost of the in-
clusion.
102
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision and
officially adopted the four factors as the appropriate test. 0 3 In its evalua-
tion, the court emphasized that the district had failed to provide any evi-
dence whatsoever that the cost of educating the student in the regular
classroom was considerably more expensive than the district's place-
ment.13 4 The court further noted that the district's estimate of cost was
inflated and inaccurate:
By inflating the cost estimates and failing to address the true com-
parison, the District did not meet its burden of proving that regular
placement would burden the District's funds or adversely affect ser-
vices available to other children. Therefore, the court found that the
cost factor did not weigh against mainstreaming Rachel.
10 5
Since Rachel H., one district court in the Seventh Circuit has ap-
plied but not adopted the Rachel H. test.10 6 Additionally, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has further clarified and distinguished the meaning of the first factor
from the other circuit tests in Seattle School District v. B.S.10 7 In B.S. the
court approved a broad interpretation of the phrase "educational benefit"
to mean "academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical
and vocational needs."'' 0 8 Where the child's severe emotional disorder
had resulted in several hospitalizations, the court held that the regular
classroom was an inappropriate placement despite the student's strong
academic performance, because the child did not receive any nonaca-
98. Bd. OfEduc. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D.Cal. 1992).
99. Holland, 786 F. Supp. at 884.
100. Id. at 880.
101. Id. at 882-83.
102. Id. at 883-84.
103. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404 (noting "this analysis directly addresses the issue of the appro-
priate placement for a child with disabilities").
104. Id. at 1402.
105. Id.
106. D.F. v. Western Sch. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
107. 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. B.S., 82 F.3d at 1500.
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demic benefits. 0 9 Thus, the court indicated that the scope of "educa-
tional benefit" should include more than mere "academic benefit."' 10
III. TENTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS THE DANIEL R.R. TEST IN L.B. EXREL. K.B.
V. NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT"'
The circuit feud continues with the Tenth Circuit's recent adoption
of the Daniel R.R. test." 2 The Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also
remain loyal to this test.1 3 The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits con-
tinue to follow Roncker, and the Ninth and Seventh Circuits employ the
Rachel H. test. 14 In L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School District, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the LRE placement of an autistic student in a private pre-
school supplemented heavily by thirty-five to forty hours of one-on-one
home instruction, in spite of the disproportionately high costs. 15 How-
ever, on remand, the court seemed to dismantle its own argument that
cost was irrelevant when it directed the district court to consider the rea-
sonableness of costs and placements in deciding how to reimburse the
parents for their expenses. 1 6 Perhaps, the court's own contradiction
suggests that the Daniel R.R. test is fine in theory but not in practice.
In Nebo, the plaintiffs-appellants had an autistic preschool-aged
child.' 17 The school district devised an IEP as required under IDEA and
placed the child in a preschool with a population consisting of more than
fifty percent handicapped students."18 Although the district had consid-
ered a mainstream placement, it identified the more restrictive preschool
as the best option for the autistic child." 9 However, the school district
did offer to increase the percentage of non-disabled students in the
child's classroom for her benefit.1 20 The district justified its placement
because the school taught special skill levels, many of which would have
met the goals and needs in the child's IEP.
121
Additionally, the school planned to provide the child with speech
and occupational therapy sessions for several hours each week, and as
many as fifteen hours of behavioral therapy. 22 However, although both
parties recognized the need for behavior therapy, appellants argued that
their daughter would only be able to master her IEP goals with thirty-five
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
112. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977.
113. Stanley, supra note 22, at 310.
114. Id.
115. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 979, 968-69.
116. Id.





122. Id. (the specific type of behavioral therapy was called Applied Behavioral Analysis).
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to forty hours of it per week. 123 The forty hours also included ten main-
stream hours at the preschool.1 24 Unhappy with the district's placement,
the appellants opted instead to unilaterally enroll their daughter in a pri-
vate preschool at their own expense for those ten hours, and they pro-
ceeded to hire at-home behavioral therapists to complete the remaining
thirty hours.
125
Appellants then requested a due process hearing for reimbursement
of the cost of the ABA instruction. 26 The hearing officer determined
that the school district's IEP and proposed fifteen hours of supplemental
aids and services constituted the appropriate LRE under IDEA. 127 Alleg-
ing violations of IDEA, appellants next filed a complaint in the United
States District Court in the District of Utah against the district for failing
to place their daughter in her LRE. 128 The parties filed cross-summary
judgment motions, and the district court held for the school district.
29
On appeal, the appellants again argued that the district court erred in
concluding that the school district had correctly identified their daugh-
ter's LRE. 130 Overturning the decisions of the hearing officer and the
district court, the court concluded that the preschool with disabled stu-
dents was not the child's LRE.
13 1
In Nebo, the Tenth Circuit carefully decided to adopt the Daniel
R.R. test. Reflecting on the Rachel H. test, the court noted that this test
shared much in common with the Daniel R.R. test, but that Rachel H.
differed because it considered cost in addition. 132 The court summarized
this distinction: "These circuits' LRE tests acknowledge the fiscal reality
that school districts with limited resources must balance the needs of
each disabled child with the needs of other children in the district."' 13 3 In
declining to adopt the Roncker approach, the court criticized Roncker as
appositive only "in cases where the more restrictive placement is consid-
ered a superior educational choice. This feature makes the Roncker test
unsuitable in cases where the least restrictive placement is also the supe-
rior educational choice."' 134 Seeking to adopt a test that the circuit could
use in any situation, the court approved the Daniel R.R. test.' 35 In apply-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 968-69.
126. Id. at 969.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 970.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 974-75.
131. Id. at 975.
132. Id. at 976.
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ing the test, the court also emphasized that the list of factors was not ex-
haustive and concluded that no factor by itself was dispositive.'
36
In its analysis of the first factor of the Daniel R.R. test, the court
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the benefits the child real-
ized from the private mainstream preschool outweighed those she would
have derived from public preschool. 37 The record revealed that the child
was actually the most advanced student academically in her mainstream
classroom using the supplemental aids and assistance. 138 However, the
court reasoned that since the child's needs were almost entirely social,
her LRE was more likely the private mainstream setting. 39 The nonaca-
demic benefits significantly outweighed those she could have received at
the public school.14 0 Finally, while the child struggled with some behav-
ioral problems, the court concluded such outbursts did not disrupt the
regular classroom. 141
Additionally, in discussing its adoption of the Daniel R.R. test, the
court stated it would not consider cost as a factor in this case since the
school district had not raised it as an issue: "[b]ecause costs are not at
issue in this case, however, this court adopts and applies . . .only the
non-cost factors ....,,4 This language suggests that if the court deter-
mined that cost was an issue in a case, it would invoke cost as factor in
its decision. 143 However, with as much as $63,800 at stake out of the
district's maximum preschool budget of $400,000, cost was certainly a
relevant issue.144 In fact, despite an explicit directive that cost was ir-
relevant in this case, in the final paragraph of the opinion the court re-
manded the case to the district to decide what expenses should be reim-
bursed to the family. 1
45
IV. ANALYSIS
Each of the three circuit tests brings a unique approach to identify-
ing a child's LRE. However, all three tests share two factors: (1) the
benefits to the disabled child and (2) the child's potential disruption to
other students in the classroom. 46 Cost has proven to be the most con-
troversial factor both in terms of whether its application is appropriate
and what test to use.' 47 Many courts have consistently stressed that cost
alone is generally not a strong enough reason to determine a disabled
136. Id.





142. Id. at 977.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 972-73.
145. Id. at 979.
146. Farley, supra note 14, at 820, 823-24, 829-30.
147. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
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child's LRE. 148 On the other hand, balancing the placement's benefits to
the child against the potential disruption to the other children, is also
insufficient if the cost places an undue burden on the district and in turn,
the other students' education in the district. 49 Accordingly, none of the
tests alone are ideal, such that if the Supreme Court decides to hear a
case on this issue, it should harness the best elements from each test to
design an improved version.
In adopting the Daniel R.R. test, like many of the previous circuits,
the Tenth Circuit in KB. v. Nebo School District 50 did not articulate
practical standards for the two common factors to aid in subsequent ap-
plications. The Nebo court's failure to adequately consider cost in its
initial LRE analysis coupled with its brief mention of reimbursement at
the last minute also signified the court's realization that excluding cost
from the test is fine in theory, but not in practical application. The bene-
fits and disruption factors when weighed against cost create a new rea-
sonableness standard that the Supreme Court should adopt.
A. An Interpretation ofNebo's Application of the Two Common Factors
1. Factor One: Benefits to the Disabled Child of the Mainstream
Classroom
The Nebo court, in adopting the Daniel R.R. test, chose to consider
the academic and nonacademic benefits separately for purposes of analy-
sis. 51 This distinction was noteworthy because it allowed for a more
detailed analysis and recognized that academic performance is not the
only measure of a child's progress. 52 In evaluating the benefits to the
autistic child, the court considered both the impact of the non-disabled
students in the mainstream setting and the supplemental aids and services
to the child. 53 The court's analysis was lacking in two respects. First,
the court did not offer specific criteria to assist later courts in applying
the factors. Second, it did not outline a practical method to assess how
much of the benefit could be attributable to the mainstream environment
versus the supplemental aids and services. The consequence of not hav-
ing explicitly outlined criteria is that there is no practical way to evaluate
how much supplemental support is required to achieve maximum benefit.
148. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178-79.
149. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 317.
150. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
151. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977-78.
152. Farley, supra note 14, at 838. A child with mental retardation, for example, may achieve
few if any academic benefits from the mainstream experience but will likely benefit tremendously
from the social interaction and mobility. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th
Cir. 1989). The Rachel H. court added the language, "in a regular classroom, supplemented with
appropriate aids and services" as a more specific point of comparison to the academic benefits the
child will receive in the special education classroom. Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874,
878 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
153. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
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Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Nebo that the aca-
demic benefits to the autistic child were more superior in the private
mainstream classroom than they would be in the public classroom is not
persuasive. 54 The court emphasized that the child was the most aca-
demically advanced student in the mainstream classroom. 55 The court
apparently assumed that the larger numbers of lower performing students
in the public school would directly correlate with a decline in her aca-
demic performance in such a classroom. 56 This reasoning is flawed be-
cause advanced learners who would benefit from the opportunity to be
challenged are present in every classroom, and yet the school district is
not able to move them to another classroom. 157 In fact, tracking students
according to ability has been proven to be detrimental to students' self
esteem and performance. 158 Rather, students function best in heteroge-
neous environments.
159
The court also failed to articulate a standard for attributing the aca-
demic benefits of a "mainstream" placement. The public preschool
classes contained more than fifty percent special education students in a
classroom. 60 Previously, the school district expressly offered to reduce
the ratio of disabled students in the autistic child's class. 16 1 Many "regu-
lar" classroom populations are also comprised of as many as thirty or
forty percent special education students. 62 Furthermore, those regular
education classrooms were taught by a teacher who likely has no back-
ground in special education instruction unlike the teachers specially
trained to work with handicapped students at the public preschool.
63
Although the evidence demonstrated that the autistic child had been suc-
cessful in her mainstream classroom, the court failed to discern how
much of her progress was attributable to the thirty-five to forty hours of
one-on-one instruction she received a week-and how much was influ-
enced by the presence of additional non-disabled students. 64 The court
seemed to ignore this reality altogether given the fact that she spent only
ten hours a week at the private preschool. 
65
With regard to the nonacademic benefit, the court's rationale was
more convincing. It focused on the child's specific disability in the area
of social interactions and reasoned that the mainstream classroom, in
154. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Telephone Interview with Kristy Hurt, Special Education Teacher, Skinner Middle
School, Denver Pub. Sch., in Denver, Colo. (Nov. 2, 2005).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 968.
161. Id.
162. Hurt, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 968, 978.
165. Id. at 968.
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surrounding her with non-disabled students with normal mannerisms,
provided a more effective social learning environment for her. 166 The
court further identified the presence of role models and a more suitable
gender ratio to support its conclusion.1 67 Interestingly, as almost a caveat
to this decision, the court qualified its analysis of the benefits and quoted
a case from the Third Circuit:
This court does not mean to imply that only an exclusively main-
stream environment meets the IDEA's LRE mandate for all children.
School officials are not required to provide an exclusively main-
stream environment in every case, and partial integration may well
constitute the provision of an LRE to the 'maximum extent appropri-
ate.'
168
The court seemed to imply that it would not always decide in favor of a
mainstream placement, almost as if realizing the potential ramifications
of this decision as precedent.
The Tenth's Circuit's conclusion that the child with autism would
benefit from the private mainstream classroom was accurate with regard
to her social benefit but less apparent as to her academic benefit. The
Court failed to articulate how necessary or beneficial the extra thirty-five
to forty hours of supplemental services were to the child. 169 In fact, it did
not even mention these additional supports in its application of the
Daniel R.R. test.170 The Nebo court's decision would have been more
effective if it had distinguished the benefit of interacting with non-
disabled peers from the benefit of the supplemental behavioral therapy.
2. Factor Two: Potential Disruption in the Regular Classroom
Whereas the aim of the "benefits" factor centers around the poten-
tially positive effects on the child in question, the "disruption" factor
focuses more intently on the potentially negative effects on the other
regular education students in the classroom and the teacher in the place-
ment decision. The Second Circuit has identified a relationship between
the amount of supplemental aids and services provided to a child and
how disruptive a child is; with the use of supplemental aids and services
there may be less disruption.' 71 The Nebo court failed to provide specific
guidelines to comprehensively account for disruption to the regular stu-
166. Id. at 978.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 978 n.17 (quoting T.R. v. Kingwood Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir.
2000)); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1045).
169. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977-79.
170. See id.
171. Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 991 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
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dents as well as the teacher, and guidelines to evaluate appropriate levels
of services required to achieve minimal disruption. 
172
The Nebo court upheld the parents' request for thirty-five to forty
hours of behavioral therapy as a necessary supplemental aid. The court
did so because the child demonstrated significant progress-not because
it identified forty hours as a limit to how many hours the child needed. It
is true that the school district must attempt to implement "positive behav-
ior strategies, interventions, and supports to address the behavior" before
placing a student with behavior problems in a more restrictive environ-
ment. 73 However, it would have been more helpful to later courts if the
Tenth Circuit had established criteria for determining if the child could
function with fewer supplemental hours.
The Tenth Circuit also did not articulate a standard for when a "dis-
ruption" could infringe on the other students' learning in the class.174 In
general, the courts have not offered guidance in this area, other than to
say that the school must demonstrate a reasonable attempt to offer effec-
tive supplements calculated to remedy the disruption. 75 The Nebo court
acknowledged that the autistic child "had some behavioral problems such
as tantruming," but was quick to discount them, indicating that this be-
havior did not seem problematic in the regular classroom. 7 6 It is diffi-
cult to know why the court determined that tantrums were not possibly
disruptive.
The Nebo court further failed to devise a standard to address the as-
pect of disruption involving the teacher's ability to instruct the class de-
spite the presence of the disabled child.' 77 The Fifth Circuit in Daniel
R.R. held that "although regular education instructors must devote extra
attention to their handicapped students, we will not require them to do so
at the expense of their entire class. 178 In contrast, the Nebo court did not
incorporate this language in its holding on this issue and did not mention
at all whether the child's behavior was or was not disruptive to the
teacher's ability to instruct the other students.'79
Overall, the Nebo court simply did not offer a clear justification for
how or why it decided to dismiss disruption as a non-issue in this case.
Had it followed the Second Circuit, the Nebo court might have found a
correlation between the autistic child's minimal disruptions in the main-
stream setting and the significant number of hours of extra therapy both
172. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
173. Farley, supra note 14, at 839.
174. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
175. Farley, supra note 14, at 839.
176. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
177. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 315-16.
178. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1051.
179. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
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in and outside the school day that she received. 80 Unlike the child in the
Second Circuit case who had not benefited from extensive or effective
supplemental aids and services and was therefore disruptive to the other
students and the teacher,' 81 the child in Nebo was at the opposite end of
the spectrum having received so many hours of one-on-one therapy. 82 It
is only possible to speculate whether she would have been more disrup-
tive with fewer hours of support. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's cur-
sory analysis of the disruption factor, only three sentences in length,
failed to identify any useful guidelines for future decisions.' 
83
B. Accounting for Cost
Whether and, more importantly, how cost should factor into the
equation continues to be a source of significant debate. 84  The Roncker
court acknowledged the financial burden that mainstreaming a child may
impose on a school district. 85 Although subsequent applications of the
Daniel R.R. test have factored cost, the language of the test itself as de-
lineated by the Fifth Circuit makes no mention of cost. 186 Furthermore,
the Rachel H. test recently marked a return to a consideration of cost.
87
However, the opinion offers little guidance on whether this factor should
be weighed as heavily as the benefits and disruption factors. 1
88
The Tenth Circuit mistakenly failed to consider cost in the Nebo de-
cision. Generally, other circuits have applied cost as a factor in two dif-
ferent ways. 89 First, some courts have balanced the costs of educating
one child against the educational and financial needs of other children in
the district.' 90 Second, some courts allow school districts to use cost as a
defense when balancing the cost of a placement against the appropriate-
ness of that placement. '9'
1. Four Reasons Why Cost Should Be a Factor
First, costs of educating special needs children have increased dra-
matically in the past three years. 92 Those expenditures are more likely
180. See Mavis, 839 F. Supp. at 989-91.
181. Id. at 991.
182. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
183. Id.
184. See generally Willard, supra note 6, at 1177-78.
185. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
186. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11 th Cir. 1991). See Daniel R.R., 874
F.2d at 1049-50.
187. Holland, 786 F. Supp. at 879-80.
188. See id
189. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178.
190. E.g., Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
191. See, e.g., Roncker, 700 F. 2d at 1064. See Willard, supra note 6, at 1178.
192. Biscelgia, supra note 1. Nationally, the percentage of K- 12 special education enrollments
continued to rise every year from 1976 until 1997, with a proportional increase of nineteen percent
from 1987-1998. Thomas P. Parrish, Special Education - At What Cost to General Education?, The
CSEF Resource, Winter 1999-2000, Ctr for Special Educ. Finance,
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due to increased enrollment of special education students and a decrease
in federal funding, rather than a function of an actual increase in per pu-
pil special education expenditures.1 93 The Tenth Circuit failed to account
for this practical reality in its decision.
Second, the link between special education placement and the abil-
ity of the school to qualify for supplemental funding creates a financial
incentive for schools to place students in more restrictive environment.
94
A recent study examined the relationship between state formulas that
distribute funds based on school district placements and the state's use of
restrictive placements for children with disabilities. 95 While states that
had the highest number of self-contained placements used funding for-
mulas based on placements, states with the lowest number of segregated
placements did not fund according to placement. 196 This study may indi-
cate that school districts have a real incentive to classify more students as
"special ed," since doing so means receiving additional state funding. 197
Decisions like Nebo produce an even more compelling reason for dis-
tricts to classify more students as "special ed" since the estimated costs
of the autistic child's supplemental aids and service constituted as much
as $63,800, approximately one-sixth of the district's total preschool
budget.' 98
Third, the courts have interpreted legislative intent to imply that
cost should be a relevant consideration in LRE placement. In noting that
IDEA directs the states to determine "priorities for providing a free ap-
propriate public education to all handicapped children," the court in Bar-
nett v. Fairfax County School Board. 199 indicated that Congress intended
for the court to balance the needs of a disabled child against competing
economic realities.2 °°
http://www.ldonline.org/ld indepth/specialeducation/at whatcost.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
In Vermont, a legislative commission set up in 1998 reported that cost-containment must become a
state-wide priority because increased expenditures are not sustainable. Id. California's special
education population has nearly doubled from 1990 to 1999. Id. (quoting Amy Pyle, Davis Asked to
Help End Special Education Funding Dispute, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1999, at A3.). An analysis of
nine school districts over more than twenty years reveals that general education expenditures had
plunged from eighty to fifty-nine percent with special education gains from four to seventeen per-
cent. Id.
193. Parrish, supra note 2, at 3. Recent studies in New York revealed that ninety percent of
increased special education funding correlated with higher enrollments. Id. at 2. A study in Wiscon-
sin indicated that virtually all revenue increases for special education had resulted from higher
enrollments as well. Id.
194. Willard, supra note 6, at 1181.
195. Willard, supra note 6, at 1184.
196. Id.
197. See generally id.
198. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 973.
199. 927 F.2d 146, 154 (4th Cir. 1991).
200. Barnett, 927 F.2d at 154 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1991) (current version at 20
U.S.C. § 1412 (2005))).
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Fourth, there is a practical limitation to how much a school can af-
ford in order to pursue the maximum benefits for the child.20 ' Even be-
fore the development of the circuit tests, the Supreme Court in Rowley
implied a limit to special needs costs: "to require ... the furnishing of
every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's
potential is ... further than Congress intended to go.
202
Accordingly, cost is a practical issue facing school districts that
Congress and the Supreme Court have acknowledged to be a relevant
concern.
2. Two Standards the Courts Have Articulated Relating to Cost
Although most circuits agree cost cannot be ignored altogether, its
role as a factor in placement decisions has been the subject of much de-
bate.203 No one wants to tell a special needs child she does not deserve a
quality education, but the courts have been clear that the most expensive
placement is not always the most appropriate for a number of reasons.2 °4
The courts have tended to analyze cost in two different ways.205 One
approach balances cost for one child against the costs of educating other
children.20 6 The second approach weighs the cost of a child's placement
against the appropriateness of the placement itself.
20 7
a. Balancing the Costs of One Child Against the Needs of the
Others
The courts adopting this method seem to recognize the realities of
IDEA as a largely unfunded mandate.208 A study conducted in the 1990s
concluded that "the cost of educating disabled students . .. is threatening
the ability of the educational institution to educate nondisabled students
in many districts and, therefore, is placing the entire public education
edifice potentially at risk., 20 9 The state of Colorado paints a bleak pic-
ture of this reality. The Colorado Department of Education has reported
that the federal government provides only seventeen percent of the requi-
site special education funding required for such students in Colorado
schools, with local dollars responsible for the bulk of expenditures cover-
ing seventy percent and only eleven percent coming from the state.21
201. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199 (1982).
202. Id.
203. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178; Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
204. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 316-17.
205. Id. at 310-11.
206. Id. E.g., Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
207. Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
208. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
209. Parrish, supra note 2, at I (quoting Bruce Meredith & Julie Underwood, Irreconcilable
Differences? Defining the Rising Conflict Between Regular and Special Education, 24 J.L. & EDUC.
195, 213 (1995).
210. Paulmeno, supra note 20.
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Accordingly, some courts have created a balancing test that consid-
ers the cost of the disabled student's education against the needs of other
students in the district.211 In Greer v. Rome City, the court articulated
this standard: "when the cost of educating a handicapped child in a regu-
lar classroom is so great that it would significantly impact the education
of other children in the district, then education in a regular classroom is
not appropriate., 212 The Eighth Circuit, adopting the Roncker test in
A. W. v. Northwest, applied a variation of the test which compares instead
the disabled child's expenses against the expenditures for other disabled
children, excluding impacts on the general education population.213 The
court agreed with the district court's finding that:
[T]he severity of the child's handicap was such that the interaction
with non-handicapped students would ... require removal of a
teacher from the state facility to provide the student with a properly
certified teacher. Due to limited available funding, the teacher would
not be replaced at the state school. Thus, the program provided to the
other handicapped students would be adversely affected by the in-
creased student/teacher ratio. The court concluded the benefit to the
student from mainstreaming was insufficient to justify a reduction in
benefits to other handicapped children; the parents' proposed place-
ment in the district would have resulted in a disproportionate expen-
diture of available funds.214
The school district in Rachel H. made a similar argument. Accord-
ing to the district, her placement would result in over a $100,000 loss in
state funding for special education funding unless she was placed in spe-
cial education classes for at least fifty-one percent of the day.215 Ulti-
mately, the Rachel H. court was not persuaded by the school district's
argument.216 In holding for the parents, the court reasoned that the cost
of mainstreaming her was not significant.217 It also refused to place her
in a more restrictive setting that would not offer her the benefits she
could reap in a regular classroom, despite the financial burden potentially
imposed on the district, and ultimately other disabled students.
21 8
In its LRE placement analysis, the Nebo court deliberately ignored
cost as a factor on the grounds that the district claimed it was not at issue
in its original decision-making process. 219 The court ignored cost even
though the expense of educating the autistic child in the regular class-
211. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
212. Id.
213. A. W., 813 F.2d at 163-64.
214. Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost be a Factor in
Special Education Cases?, 71 ED. L. REP. 11, 22 (1992); A. W., 813 F.2d at 160-63.
215. Holland, 14 F.3d at 1402, 1404.
216. Id. at 1404.
217. Id. at 1402.
218. Id. at 1402, 1404.
219. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977.
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room with the forty hours of supplemental aids and services equated al-
most one sixth of the district's entire preschool budget of $400,000, and
even though both the district and the parents' expert indicated that only
twelve to fifteen hours of additional support for the child would have
likely accommodated her. 220 The court did point out that in some cir-
cuits, "LRE tests acknowledge the fiscal reality that school districts with
limited resources must balance the needs of each disabled child with the
needs of other children in the district," but drew the unlikely conclusion
that costs are simply not an issue in this case.22'
In acknowledging the discrepancy in the cost to educate the child in
comparison to the remainder of the budget to provide for all other special
needs children, the Nebo court seemed to follow the Rachel H. court.222
The school in A. W. identified a specific need and argued that holding for
the one child would specifically deprive the other special needs chil-
dren.223 A. W. can be distinguished from Rachel H. and Nebo in that in
A. W., the school district specifically identified how placement in the
LRE for the handicapped plaintiff would deprive other disabled children
from the appropriate student-teacher ratio.224 Whereas the Rachel H. and
Nebo court considered a nebulous dollar figure, the A. W court con-
fronted concrete inequity. Perhaps that resulted in the different holding.
b. Cost as a Defense: Balancing Cost Against the Appropriate
Placement
Like the courts in the previous section suggested, the Roncker court
concluded that cost is an appropriate factor because excessive spending
on one disabled child can withhold needed funds from other handicapped
students.225 However, Roncker applied a slightly different standard.226
The court permitted school districts to use cost as a defense provided that
the district could prove that it had allocated its funds to render services to
the child along an appropriate continuum of different placements. 227 The
court held that the school's individual education program committee
must choose from a continuum of ten different possible LREs when
evaluating a particular student.28 At the same time, the court in
220. Id. at 973.
221. Id. at 977.
222. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 979; Holland, 14 F.3d at 1402; see generally Willard, supra note 6, at
1183-84.
223. A. W., 813 F.2d at 161-62; Nebo, 379 F.3d at 979; Holland, 14 F.3d at 1402, 1404.
224. Id.
225. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
226. Id. at 1062.
227. Id. at 1063.
228. Id.; see also Harley A. Tomey, III, IEP: Individualized Education Program The Process,
Virginia Department of Education, http://www.ldonline.org/ld indepth/iep/iep_process.hml (last
visited Jan. 28, 2006). The continuum ranges from option 1 that offers direct instruction and/or
consultation services within the regular classroom, to option three providing direct instruction within
the regular classroom and content instruction in a special education classroom, to option seven
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Roncker, refused to consider cost or the merits of an alternative place-
ment when the child had never been placed in a fully mainstreamed set-
ting.229 Although the Daniel R.R. test does not emphasize cost as a fac-
tor, its first factor is similar to this approach in requiring that a school
demonstrate it took sufficient steps to accommodate the child's needs in
the regular classroom before removing her.23°
This second approach to a cost analysis mirrors the language of that
IDEA which mandates states provide a "free and appropriate education"
to all handicapped children. 231 As the court in Rowley indicated, "appro-
priate" does not require a school to completely optimize these services,
as long as the child is benefiting educationally from the program in
place. 232 The courts have often considered cost when weighing two dif-
ferent placement or service options. If a second service or placement
option exists that would also provide a free and appropriate education at
a lower price, the courts have sometimes opted for such an alternative.233
At issue in Barnett was whether a center placement for a hearing
impaired student was an acceptable alternative to a placement in her
neighborhood school that did not offer the appropriate services to meet
the child's special needs.234 Although the neighborhood school was truly
the LRE, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the center school could best
meet the child's needs.235 Rather than evaluate cost in terms of other
students in the district, the court here considered cost against the appro-
priate placement in determining that the center placement was "appropri-
ate" even though it was not the best possible education the school district
236could offer with unlimited funding.
Similarly, in Detsel v. Board of Education,237 the court declined to
provide a severely handicapped child with close supervision by a highly
trained nurse due to the excessive burden of cost.238 In Clovis Unified-
School District v. California Office of Administrative Hearings,239 the
court considered two different placements, a residential home costing
$50,000 and a psychiatric facility costing $150,000.240 In finding for the
offering separate private day school for students with disabilities, to option ten, a hospital setting.
Id.
229. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
230. DanielR.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
231. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) & (a)(5)(A).
232. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-201 (1982).
233. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that where
two placements are proposed, but only one is appropriate, cost is irrelevant and therefore, should not
factor into the decision).
234. Barnett, 927 F.2d at 154.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987).
238. Detsel, 820 F.2d at 588.
239. 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
240. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir.
1990).
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school district's recommendation of the residential home, the court ac-
knowledged a limit that a district must spend to adequately meet a child's
special needs.24'
The Tenth Circuit in Nebo had two placement options much like the
cases discussed above, both of which were arguably appropriate on the
242hoeoncontinuum, as required by Roncker and IDEA. In fact, homebound
placement is actually the ninth most restrictive environment which is
where the child spent most of her instructional time with the forty hours
243of one-on-one instruction in the parent's preferred placement.
In applying this cost analysis to the Nebo decision, it is first neces-
sary to determine whether the autistic child had the opportunity to be
mainstreamed to the fullest amount possible.244 At first glance, the court
said she did not because the public preschool placement was not the
LRE.245 However, the answer to this question is more complicated and
somewhat more difficult given the split-nature of her time, which actu-
ally closely parallels the district court's placement in Roncker that the
appellate court rejected.246 Unlike the parents in Roncker who were
unhappy with the placement in a segregated setting at another school
coupled with transportation to a mainstream setting midday for lunch and
integration, the autistic child's parents in Nebo favored the split-time
arrangement with the additional time in what was primarily a homebound
setting.247 In fact, although homebound placement is actually the ninth
most restrictive placement option, it was where she spent most of her
instructional time with the forty hours of one-on-one instruction in the
parent's preferred placement. 248 This intensive forty-hour training plusthe private school tuition presented a much costlier option.249
The child's alternative placement proposed by the school district is
actually a LRE in that it offered ten hours of instruction in a setting with
approximately half non-disabled students with support from trained
therapists for ten to fifteen hours a week, including some on campus and
some at home hours. 250 This option is also much more cost efficient than
the private school, and had the Roncker, Detsel, Clovis or Barnett courts
decided this case, it might have come out differently.
241. Collins & Zirkel, supra note 214, at 23.
242. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 976, 978.
243. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
244. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1065 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Nebo. 379 F.3d at 977-78.
246. Id. at 972-73; Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
247. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 968; Roncker 700 F.2d at 1059, 1061.
248. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 972-73; Tomey, supra note 228.
249. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 972-73.
250. Id. at 968.
[Vol. 83:3
2006] L.B. EX REL. K.B. V. NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT 787
In the end, the school district erred in not arguing cost as its de-
fense.25' On appeal, the school district's special education director
claimed that "cost never entered into [its] decision to provide services"
and that the district "never said it would not provide a particular service
solely because of cost concerns. 252 Although cost is never the only rea-
son to decline services, it is a factor that should not be ignored by the
Tenth Circuit or a school district.253 To pretend cost is irrelevant is to
deny other children the services they deserve without an all-out court
battle and to pretend that some placements are just as effective without
all the bells and whistles.
C. A New Reasonableness Standard for Cost: The Beetle, Not the Cadil-
lac of Placement
The courts cannot continue to ignore the practical realities of im-
plementation issues in the classroom coupled with the economic realities
of an unfunded mandate. The last time the Supreme Court spoke directly
on the issue in Rowley was over two decades ago.254 The court at that
time was cognizant that "to require . . . the furnishing of every special
[education] service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's po-
tential is ... further than Congress intended to go. '255 In other words, in
terms of practical application, the Court's holding implies that it would
be impossible to arm every special needs child with the "Cadillac place-
ment" on the continuum of services.256 A more appropriate and realistic
placement to strive for would be the "Volkswagon beetle placement."
257
The beetle is a metaphor for the quality of placement a school district can
be expected to deliver.258 The idea of IDEA is to ensure that the special
education students have the supplemental services-the gas, if you
will-they need to drive a beetle.259
Ultimately, the beetle represents a "reasonableness" standard which
would enable districts to "use cost as a defense against 'unreasonable'
demands, provided a continuum of appropriate [placement] options are
available to children with disabilities. ' 260 The courts must of course use
tailored judgment for each individual child since what may be a reason-
251. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
252. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 972-73.
253. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178-79.
254. See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.
255. Id at 199.
256. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
257. Id. All too often, by the time cases like this one get appealed, the child is already experi-
encing such high achievement that removal seems inappropriate even though the supplementary
services are excessive. Id. Somewhere the courts need to draw the line between achievement and
exceptional achievement. Id.
258. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
259. Id.
260. Janet R. Beales, Special Education: Expenditures and Obligations, Policy Study No. 161,
Reason Foundation, Los Angeles, Cal. (July 1993) available at
http://www.rppi.org/education/ps16l.html.
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able or even an essential demand for one child could be unreasonable for
another child. 26' Additionally, a reasonableness standard such as this
should sidestep placing a specific limitation on price; rather, in deter-
mining appropriate placement, the district and the court should balance
the academic and nonacademic benefits to a student against the necessary
supplemental services required to prevent disruption in the regular class-
room and the costs of providing those services.262 The price tag will in-
evitably depend on the costs of the necessary supplements and services
that will enable the child in the beetle to function adequately in the
LRE.263
Indirect support for such a reasonableness standard also comes from
the Supreme Court's guidance in Florence County School District v.
Carter264 and Burlington v. Department of Education265 on a related cost
issue-private school tuition reimbursement to parents who have unilat-
erally withdrawn their child from a public school placement and enrolled
her in a private school.266 Citing to those decisions, the Nebo court indi-
cated that the parents were entitled to receive reimbursement for "the
reasonable cost of the services provided to [their daughter] in support of
her mainstream preschool education.', 267  However, in addressing the
issue of reimbursement, the Nebo court tried to argue that it was a com-
pletely separate issue from cost and its relation to LRE:
Whereas the issue of the allegedly unreasonable cost of [the autistic
child's behavioral therapy] was not presenttd to the district court in
the context of LRE, it was presented in the context of equitable con-
siderations under Burlington and Carter. As a consequence, in the
latter context this issue has not been waived.
268
Nevertheless, the end result of reimbursement is actually just the same as
cases decided under Rachel H. or Roncker-the district loses the money
that could have gone to support other special needs children. 269 The sub-
stantive debate surrounding cost and reimbursement is the same even if
the school district did not procedurally raise the issue of cost in district
court.270 The Tenth Circuit's decision to disguise cost as reimbursementin the final page of the opinion demonstrates further that the court, in
261. Id. at 33.
262. Id. at 24; Mavis, 839 F. Supp. at 991 (emphasizing that a strong correlation exists between
the amount of supplemental aids and services provided and how disruptive a child is).
263. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
264. 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
265. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
266. See Florence, 510 U.S. at 11, 15.
267. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
268. Id. at 979.
269. See generally Willard, supra note 6.
270. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
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deciding not to consider cost in the analysis section, later realized that
practically speaking, cost was at issue.27'
Interestingly, in articulating criteria for the lower court to evaluate
the reasonableness of the reimbursement cost, the Nebo court relied on
the Supreme Court's suggestion in Burlington and Carter.2 72 Although
reimbursement may be a different issue, there is a significant amount of
overlap. Thus, these Supreme Court decisions and Nebo can inform the
development of a new reasonableness test for cost and LRE placement.
The Nebo court reiterated two sub-factors, identical to the two addressed
by different circuits at length in the preceding two sections.273 First, the
court asked the district court to consider whether the reimbursement for
two school years would "impose a disproportionate burden on Nebo's
preschool budget., 274  Second, the court directed the lower court to
evaluate the cost and the appropriateness of placement on remand:
[T]he district court should consider equitable factors such as whether
[the autistic child] needed forty hours of [behavioral therapy] per
week in order to succeed in her mainstream classroom. In consider-
ing this equitable factor, the district should give due deference to [the
expert's] fmding that [the child] needed only twenty to thirty hours of
at-home [therapy].
275
Unintentionally, the Nebo court's discussion of reimbursement
frames the proposed reasonableness standard.276 Unlike the theoretical
constructs of the court's opinion and its failure to spell out clear stan-
dards for the benefits, disruption and cost factors, the Tenth Circuit es-
sentially charged the district court with assessing the benefits and costs
of placement.277
In application, since the district court's remanded opinion has not
been released, it is only possible to speculate as to how the Nebo decision
and LRE placement might have come out differently had the court ap-
plied its own standards for reasonableness. In its initial decision, the
Nebo court upheld the "Cadillac placement" in placing the child in a pri-
vate mainstream preschool and providing her with forty hours of one-on-
one instruction (the Cadillac of class size).278 The mainstream school
placement and the forty hours of supplemental aids and services did
come with a hefty price tag of up to $63,800 annually.
279
271. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978-79.
272. Id.





278. See generally id. at 970.
279. Id. at 973.
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A more reasonable placement would have considered the two sub-
factors as suggested by the Nebo court.280 First, based on cost alone, it is
likely that the cost of tuition at approximately $60,000 annually plus
reimbursement for two previous years at $120,000 would impose a sig-
nificant hardship on the district's ability to fund services for other dis-
abled children out of a budget of $400,000.81
Second, a consideration of cost as it relates to the appropriateness of
the placement identifies a possible alternative "beetle placement" in lieu
of the parents' "Cadillac placement." A Nebo expert testified that the
child had shown significant progress with only twenty hours over a four-
month period.282 Since this autistic child was the most academically ad-
vanced in a class of regular non-disabled students, such a high level of
performance suggests that the supplemental services required to keep her
from being disruptive and enable her growth were perhaps over the
top.
283
While the district erred in placing her at the public preschool where
she might regress under the potential negative influence of other disabled
children's behavior and mannerisms, 284 an alternative, more reasonable
placement exists. This alternative ("beetle") placement would continue
placement at the private school with only twenty hours of behavioral
therapy a week since expert testimony indicated that she had been suc-
cessful during a four-month period with this amount of support. Accord-
ingly, this placement balances the excessive cost of the personal instruc-
tion tutoring against both costs to other children and the cost of her
placement against its appropriateness.
CONCLUSION
With the cost of special education continuing to rise, the Tenth Cir-
cuit and others will continue to face more and more cases concerning
285cost as an issue. The Nebo court was unable to ignore cost altogether
because of its practical realities. Most courts have recognized a need to
evaluate LRE placement with cost in mind. The Nebo court's discussion
of reimbursement alluded to two sub-factors many circuits have already
considered in previous decisions. The first sub-factor is important be-
cause it forces the courts to consider how choosing the Cadillac place-
280. Id. at 979.
281. ld. at 973,978-79.
282. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 973.
283. Id. at 978.
284. Id. at 973.
285. Biscelgia, supra note 1; See Complaint at 1, 6, Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., No.
I:05-cv-02248-WDM (10th Cir. Nov. 04, 2005). The Thompson School District in Berthoud, Colo-
rado, is appealing a hearing officer's approval of the parents' decision to withdraw their autistic
child from the district and enroll him in a residential placement private school in Boston. Id at 6.
The district and the parents disagree on the appropriate LRE placement, and cost is a major issue
since the parents are seeking $137,000 in tuition reimbursement for the private school placement.
[Vol. 83:3
2006] L.B. EX REL. K.B. V. NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT 791
ment may burden the school district and ultimately reduce services of-
fered to other students in the district. The second sub-factor juxtaposes
cost with the benefits and disruption factors. The reasonableness stan-
dard does not undermine IDEA's objective to identify a child's LRE.
Rather, it reinforces the Supreme Court's interpretation of IDEA in Row-
ley that school districts are not required to provide the Cadillac to every
child. What the reasonableness standard has the power to accomplish is
bridging the abstract, theoretical approach of the circuit tests with the
practical realities that school districts face.
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